How to Deny a Presupposition

This paper deals with the puzzle of sentences like (i.a), which denies (i.b).
(i) a. The King of France is not bald, because there is no King of France.
b. The King of France is bald.
In previous analyses of such examples two problems are often overlooked: the first is that (i.a) is supposed to express denial of (i.b)
specifically on the grounds that the existence of a King of France is its
presupposition, but it is not clear how, if at all, (i.a) does so; the second
is that (i.a) is not very natural—when speakers wish to deny presuppositions, they usually choose different constructions, e.g. (ii).
(ii) The King of France can’t be bald, because there is no King of France.
I argue that the negation in (i.a) and (ii) is the standard descriptive negation. Sentence (ii) demonstrates that the existence of a French king is a presupposition of (i.b), and rejects (i.b) on these grounds.
Sentence (i.a) is entailed by (ii); hence, when the latter is true, so is the former. However, (i.a) is not as good a sentence because it, unlike (ii), does not say that (ib) is denied because of presupposition failure.