Ideology and Strategy among Politicians: The Case of Judicial Independence

Dror Brenner, Alon Cohen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Politicians act strategically. In the face of competition they modify their decisions in order to restrict the latitude of their potential successors. On the other hand, politicians have ideological preferences that also affect their decisions. The literature, however, has neglected to fully explore the interaction between these two considerations. This work offers such an analysis, using an empirical investigation of judicial independence as an example. We show that when the interaction between ideological considerations and strategic ones is accounted for, the impact of political competition on the level of judicial independence that politicians prefer - may in fact be opposite to the traditional wisdom.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)333-375
Number of pages43
JournalReview of Law and Economics
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2016

Keywords

  • ideology and strategy
  • judicial independence
  • political considerations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)
  • Law

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