Imperfect memory and choice under risk

Daniel Gottlieb

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.013

Imperfect memory and choice under risk

Daniel Gottlieb

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self-deception. I assume that people have preferences over their own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and can manipulate their memories. The model provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. It implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected utility theory after a choice has been faced a sufficiently large number of times.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	127-158
Number of pages	32
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	85
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.013
State	Published - 1 May 2014
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Behavioral economics
Memory
Self deception

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.013

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AB - This paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self-deception. I assume that people have preferences over their own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and can manipulate their memories. The model provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. It implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected utility theory after a choice has been faced a sufficiently large number of times.

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KW - Self deception

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Imperfect memory and choice under risk

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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