In defense of defect

Oscar Volij

doi:10.1006/game.2001.0893

In defense of defect

Oscar Volij

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are restricted to choosing machines with a uniformly bounded complexity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	309-321
Number of pages	13
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	39
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0893
State	Published - 1 Jan 2002
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Automata
Complexity
Prisoner's dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/game.2001.0893

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abstract = "The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are restricted to choosing machines with a uniformly bounded complexity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72.",

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KW - Prisoner's dilemma

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In defense of defect

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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