Incorporating reality into social choice: Blue sky ideas track

Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

When voting on a proposal one in fact chooses between two alternatives: (i) A new hypothetical social state depicted by the proposal and (ii) the status quo (henceforth: Reality); a Yes vote favors a transition to the proposed hypothetical state, while a No vote favors Reality. Social Choice theory generalizes voting on one proposal to ranking multiple proposals; that Reality was forsaken during this generalization is, in our view, inexplicable. Here we propose to rectify this neglect and incorporate Reality into Social Choice, distinguishing Reality from hypothesis. We show that doing so: (i) Offers a natural resolution to Condorcet's paradox; (ii) Explains what approval voters approve; (iii) Produces a simple and efficient Condorcet-consistent show-of-hands agenda; (iv) Produces democratic action plans, which start with Reality and proceed in democratically-supported transitions; and (v) Nullifies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and hence abdicates Arrow's Theorem. Arrow's theorem was taken to show that democracy, conceived as government by the will of the people, is an incoherent illusion. Incorporating Reality into Social Choice may clear this intellectual blemish on democracy and offer a coherent, simple, efficient, easy to communicate, and trustworthy path forward to democracy.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages1188-1192
Number of pages5
ISBN (Print)9781510868083
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2018
Event17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 - Stockholm, Sweden
Duration: 10 Jul 201815 Jul 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume2
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018
Country/TerritorySweden
CityStockholm
Period10/07/1815/07/18

Keywords

  • Arrow's theorem
  • Condorcet criterion
  • Iterated approval voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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