Information aggregation in large collective purchases

Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Society uses the following mechanism to decide on the supply of an experience good. Each agent can choose whether or not to contribute to the good. Contributions are collected, and the good is supplied whenever total contributions exceed a threshold. We study the case where the good is excludable, agents have a common value, and each agent receives a private signal about the common value. We study how such collective decisions perform in terms of information aggregation, social efficiency, and market traction.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomic Theory
StateAccepted/In press - 1 Jan 2023


  • Crowdfunding
  • Information aggregation
  • Public good
  • Threshold
  • Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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