Information aggregation in large collective purchases

Itai Arieli; Moran Koren; Rann Smorodinsky

doi:10.1007/s00199-023-01525-w

Information aggregation in large collective purchases

Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky

Department of Industrial Engineering and Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Society uses the following mechanism to decide on the supply of an experience good. Each agent can choose whether or not to contribute to the good. Contributions are collected, and the good is supplied whenever total contributions exceed a threshold. We study the case where the good is excludable, agents have a common value, and each agent receives a private signal about the common value. We study how such collective decisions perform in terms of information aggregation, social efficiency, and market traction.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	295-345
Number of pages	51
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	78
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01525-w
State	Published - 1 Aug 2024

Keywords

Crowdfunding
D70
D71
D72
D80
D82
D83
Information aggregation
Public good
Threshold
Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00199-023-01525-w

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Information aggregation in large collective purchases

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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