Abstract
Floridi’s Theory of Strongly Semantic Information posits the Veridicality Thesis (i.e., in-formation is true). One motivation is that it can serve as a foundation for information-based epistemology being an alternative to the tripartite theory of knowledge. However, the Veridicality thesis is false, if ‘information’ is to play an explanatory role in human cognition. Another motivation is avoiding the so-called Bar-Hillel/Carnap paradox (i.e., any contradiction is maximally informative). But this paradox only seems paradoxical, if (a) ‘information’ and ‘informativeness’ are synonymous, (b) logic is a theory of in-ference, or (c) validity suffices for rational inference; a, b, and c are false.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 131-151 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 83 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2016 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History
- Philosophy
- History and Philosophy of Science