Institutional traps and economic growth

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

34 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article's point of departure is that low-quality institutions, concentration of political power and material wealth, and underdevelopment are persistent over time. Its analytical model views an equal distribution of political power as a commitment device to enhance institutional quality, thereby promoting growth. The politically powerful coalition contemplates relinquishing of its power through democratization, weighing this advantageous consequence against the limit on own appropriative ability that it entails. The possibility of two developmental paths is exhibited: with concentration of political and economic power, low-quality institutions, and slow growth; and a more equal distribution of political and economic resources, high-quality institutions, and faster growth.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1043-1066
Number of pages24
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume49
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2008

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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