Abstract
In rent seeking contests agents compete over a given amount of resource a prize. To increase the likelihood of winning the prize, the agents expend efforts. This paper addresses the issue of entry to and entry deterrence from rent seeking contest. The main purpose of the analysis is to provide an explanation for the empirical fact that the number of participants in contests is usually small. I also obtain results on the relationship between the intensity of competition in a contest and the amount of the contenders’expenditures.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 79-91 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Economics and Politics |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Jan 1995 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics