Abstract
Are moral properties intellectually indispensable, and, if so, what consequences does this have for our understanding of their nature, and of our talk and knowledge of them? Are mathematical objects intellectually indispensable, and, if so, what consequences does this have for our understanding of their nature, and of our talk and knowledge of them? What similarities are there, if any, in the answers to the first two questions? Can comparison of the two cases shed light on which answers are most plausible in either case? This chapter—the introduction to the volume Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics—elucidates these questions and sketches their history.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics |
| Subtitle of host publication | Debunking and Dispensability |
| Editors | Uri Leibowitz, Neil Sinclair |
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 1-22 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191824326 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780198778592 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 2016 |