Abstract
Confronted with the great variety one can find today in the work of those often labeled (either by themselves or by others) as “relationalists”, “naïve realists”, or “disjunctivists”, one could be excused for thinking that relationalism has no common core, but is instead a constellation of views, which at best bear a kind of family resemblance to each other. We believe that this impression would be inaccurate. Relationalism is best thought of not as a constellation of loosely interrelated views, but as a single wellspring of views, which has both a common core, and a variety of versions which differ from each other along two central axes of variation. In the first half of this introduction, we articulate this structure of relationalist views by constructing a common logical space for them. In the introduction's second part, we use this logical space to introduce the various contributions this volume collects.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Relational View of Perception |
Subtitle of host publication | New Philosophical Essays |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
Pages | 1-42 |
Number of pages | 42 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781040301104 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781032448190 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2025 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Arts and Humanities