TY - JOUR
T1 - Is the active fund management industry concentrated enough?
AU - Feldman, David
AU - Saxena, Konark
AU - Xu, Jingrui
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank anonymous referees and Vikas Agarwal, Marie Briére, Prachi Deuskar, Roger Edelen, Gonçalo Faria, Ron Giammarino, Abigail Hornstein, María González Pérez, Gur Huberman, Arati Kale, Chang Mo Kang, Paul Karehnke, Lei Shi, Kai Li, Didier Maillard, Bertrand Maillet, David Nanigian, Linda Pesante, Matthew Spiegel, Yoav Tamir, Thomas Ruf, Khim Veasna, and Russell Wermers for helpful discussions. We also thank seminar participants at McGill University, University of New South Wales, Xiamen University, Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, Midwest Finance Association Annual Meetings, International Conference of the French Finance Association, International Conference of the Financial Engineering and Banking Society, Portuguese Finance Network International Conference, Spanish Finance Association Finance Forum, Center for Analytical Finance, Indian School of Business, Hyderabad, Summer Research Conference in Finance, World Finance Conference, Behavioral Finance and Capital Markets Conference, Finance Research Workshop at Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, Paul Woolley Center Capital Market Dysfunctionality Conference, Southern Finance Association annual meeting, International Risk Management Conference, the Role of Hedge Funds and Other Collective Investment Funds in the Modern World Conference, the Financial Management Association annual meeting, Greater China Area Finance Conference, and China International Conference in Finance. Jingrui Xu's research was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, Grant Number 20720181061.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2020/4/1
Y1 - 2020/4/1
N2 - We introduce a theoretical model of the active fund management industry (AFMI) in which performance and size depend on the AFMI's competitiveness (concentration). Under plausible assumptions, as AFMI's concentration decreases, so do fund managers’ incentives for exerting effort in search of alpha. Consequently, managers produce lower gross alpha, and rational investors, inferring lower expected AFMI performance, allocate a smaller portion of their wealth to active funds. Empirically, we find that a decrease in the US mutual fund industry concentration over our sample period is associated with a decrease in its net alpha and size (relative to stock market capitalization).
AB - We introduce a theoretical model of the active fund management industry (AFMI) in which performance and size depend on the AFMI's competitiveness (concentration). Under plausible assumptions, as AFMI's concentration decreases, so do fund managers’ incentives for exerting effort in search of alpha. Consequently, managers produce lower gross alpha, and rational investors, inferring lower expected AFMI performance, allocate a smaller portion of their wealth to active funds. Empirically, we find that a decrease in the US mutual fund industry concentration over our sample period is associated with a decrease in its net alpha and size (relative to stock market capitalization).
KW - Active fund management
KW - Alpha
KW - Effort
KW - Industry size
KW - Market concentration
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85071845439&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.08.009
DO - 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.08.009
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85071845439
SN - 0304-405X
VL - 136
SP - 23
EP - 43
JO - Journal of Financial Economics
JF - Journal of Financial Economics
IS - 1
ER -