TY - GEN
T1 - K7
T2 - 6th Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop, ICSS 2020
AU - Biham, Eli
AU - Bitan, Sara
AU - Dankner, Alon
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 ACM.
PY - 2020/12/8
Y1 - 2020/12/8
N2 - One of the main obstacles of securing industrial control systems is the lack of an appropriatesecurity model that is both implementable by vendors and addresses the inherent security and usability issues needed by organizations. Current solutions such as device passwords and IPSec lack scalable key management infrastructure and fine granularity access control mechanisms. In this paper we propose a novel security model for industrial control systems that supports organizational level authorizations and authentication requirements, while hiding the low-level details (e.g., keys and passwords) from the users. It also allows to easily add and remove PLCs, engineering stations, HMI devices and users, and assign permissions to them. The core of the model is a new ICS secure protocolthat we call K7. Without loss of generality, we base our protocol on the Siemens S7 protocol, and enhance it with new cryptographic features to support the extra functionality. We use a ticket-basedsystem (e.g., Kerberos with LDAP server) to support the exchange of permissions and keys, and incorporate it into our protocol. To prove our solution, we implemented K7 as a protocol converter add-on to standard Siemens clients and PLCs that transform them into augmented devices that use K7. A major advantage is its support for ICS systems, that contain legacy devices, and the simple ability to upgrade their security using device augmentation. We hope that Siemens and other vendors will adddirect support for K7 on their ICS systems.
AB - One of the main obstacles of securing industrial control systems is the lack of an appropriatesecurity model that is both implementable by vendors and addresses the inherent security and usability issues needed by organizations. Current solutions such as device passwords and IPSec lack scalable key management infrastructure and fine granularity access control mechanisms. In this paper we propose a novel security model for industrial control systems that supports organizational level authorizations and authentication requirements, while hiding the low-level details (e.g., keys and passwords) from the users. It also allows to easily add and remove PLCs, engineering stations, HMI devices and users, and assign permissions to them. The core of the model is a new ICS secure protocolthat we call K7. Without loss of generality, we base our protocol on the Siemens S7 protocol, and enhance it with new cryptographic features to support the extra functionality. We use a ticket-basedsystem (e.g., Kerberos with LDAP server) to support the exchange of permissions and keys, and incorporate it into our protocol. To prove our solution, we implemented K7 as a protocol converter add-on to standard Siemens clients and PLCs that transform them into augmented devices that use K7. A major advantage is its support for ICS systems, that contain legacy devices, and the simple ability to upgrade their security using device augmentation. We hope that Siemens and other vendors will adddirect support for K7 on their ICS systems.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85104194044&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3442144.3442149
DO - 10.1145/3442144.3442149
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85104194044
T3 - ACM International Conference Proceeding Series
SP - 1
EP - 12
BT - Proceedings - 6th Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop, ICSS 2020
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 8 December 2020 through 8 December 2020
ER -