TY - JOUR
T1 - Large-scale election campaigns
T2 - Combinatorial Shift Bribery
AU - Bredereck, Robert
AU - Faliszewski, Piotr
AU - Niedermeier, Rolf
AU - Talmon, Nimrod
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 AI Access Foundation. All rights reserved.
PY - 2016/3/1
Y1 - 2016/3/1
N2 - We study the complexity of a combinatorial variant of the Shift Bribery problem in elections. In the standard Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election where each voter has a preference order over the set of candidates and where an outside agent, the briber, can pay each voter to rank the briber's favorite candidate a given number of positions higher. The goal is to ensure the victory of the briber's preferred candidate. The combinatorial variant of the problem, introduced in this paper, models settings where it is possible to affect the position of the preferred candidate in multiple votes, either positively or negatively, with a single bribery action. This variant of the problem is particularly interesting in the context of large-scale campaign management problems (which, from the technical side, are modeled as bribery problems). We show that, in general, the combinatorial variant of the problem is highly intractable; specifically, NP-hard, hard in the parameterized sense, and hard to approximate. Nevertheless, we provide parameterized algorithms and approximation algorithms for natural restricted cases.
AB - We study the complexity of a combinatorial variant of the Shift Bribery problem in elections. In the standard Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election where each voter has a preference order over the set of candidates and where an outside agent, the briber, can pay each voter to rank the briber's favorite candidate a given number of positions higher. The goal is to ensure the victory of the briber's preferred candidate. The combinatorial variant of the problem, introduced in this paper, models settings where it is possible to affect the position of the preferred candidate in multiple votes, either positively or negatively, with a single bribery action. This variant of the problem is particularly interesting in the context of large-scale campaign management problems (which, from the technical side, are modeled as bribery problems). We show that, in general, the combinatorial variant of the problem is highly intractable; specifically, NP-hard, hard in the parameterized sense, and hard to approximate. Nevertheless, we provide parameterized algorithms and approximation algorithms for natural restricted cases.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84961774433&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1613/jair.4927
DO - 10.1613/jair.4927
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:84961774433
SN - 1076-9757
VL - 55
SP - 603
EP - 652
JO - Journal Of Artificial Intelligence Research
JF - Journal Of Artificial Intelligence Research
ER -