TY - GEN
T1 - Large-scale election campaigns
T2 - 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015
AU - Bredereck, Robert
AU - Faliszewski, Piotr
AU - Niedermeier, Rolf
AU - Talmon, Nimrod
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2015, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
PY - 2015/1/1
Y1 - 2015/1/1
N2 - We study the complexity of a combinatorial variant of the Shift Bribery problem in elections. In the standard Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election where each voter has a preference order over the candidate set and where an outside agent, the briber, can pay each voter to rank the briber's favorite candidate a given number of positions higher. The goal is to ensure the victory of the briber's preferred candidate. The combinatorial variant of the problem, introduced in this paper, models settings where it is possible to affect the position of the preferred candidate in multiple votes, either positively or negatively, with a single bribery action. This variant of the problem is particularly interesting in the context of large-scale campaign management problems (which, from the technical side, are modeled as bribery problems). We show that, in general, the combinatorial variant of the problem is highly intractable (NP-hard, hard in the parameterized sense, and hard to approximate), but we provide some (approximation) algorithms for natural restricted cases.
AB - We study the complexity of a combinatorial variant of the Shift Bribery problem in elections. In the standard Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election where each voter has a preference order over the candidate set and where an outside agent, the briber, can pay each voter to rank the briber's favorite candidate a given number of positions higher. The goal is to ensure the victory of the briber's preferred candidate. The combinatorial variant of the problem, introduced in this paper, models settings where it is possible to affect the position of the preferred candidate in multiple votes, either positively or negatively, with a single bribery action. This variant of the problem is particularly interesting in the context of large-scale campaign management problems (which, from the technical side, are modeled as bribery problems). We show that, in general, the combinatorial variant of the problem is highly intractable (NP-hard, hard in the parameterized sense, and hard to approximate), but we provide some (approximation) algorithms for natural restricted cases.
KW - Approximation algorithms
KW - Campaign management
KW - Computational complexity
KW - Fixed-parameter tractability
KW - Parameterized complexity
KW - Preference aggregation
KW - Voting
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84944683988&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84944683988
T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
SP - 67
EP - 75
BT - AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
A2 - Elkind, Edith
A2 - Bordini, Rafael H.
A2 - Weiss, Gerhard
A2 - Yolum, Pinar
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Y2 - 4 May 2015 through 8 May 2015
ER -