Learning with perfect information

Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


For extensive form games with perfect information, consider a learning process in which, at any iteration, each player unilaterally deviates to a best response to his current conjectures of others' strategies; and then updates his conjectures in accordance with the induced play of the game. We show that, for generic payoffs, the outcome of the game becomes stationary, and is consistent with Nash equilibrium. In general, if payoffs have ties or if players observe more of each others' strategies than is revealed by plays of the game, the same result holds provided a rationality constraint is imposed on unilateral deviations: no player changes his moves in subgames that he deems unreachable, unless he stands to improve his payoff there. Moreover, with this constraint, the sequence of strategies and conjectures also becomes stationary, and yields a self-confirming equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)304-324
Number of pages21
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2004


  • Convergence in finite time
  • Learning in extensive form games
  • Objective updates
  • Perfect information
  • Self-confirming and Nash equilibria

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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