Life and Death in Hegelian Judgements

Hegel contends that judgements are contradictory, finite and untrue. Prominent scholars argue that Hegel's issue with judgements is resolved in the later stages of his Logic. Specifically, Ng suggests that this solution is found in Hegel's discussion of life. In this article, I argue that not only does life fail to resolve Hegel's problem with judgement - death highlights its insolubility. To support this claim, I examine Hegel's discussion of judgements in the Logic, showing that judgements are inherently contradictory because they both unite and separate individuals and universals. Instead of being resolved retrospectively, I demonstrate that contradiction, finitude and untruth are intrinsic to judgements. Moreover, since judgements play a constitutive and determinative role in Hegel's metaphysics, they pass their contradictions, finitude and untruth onto the objects they constitute. Specifically, I argue that for living beings, judgement is literally a matter of life and death, because the contradiction of judgements implies the finitude of the objects they constitute - namely, the perishability of things and the mortality of organisms.