Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games

Ezra Einy, Bezalel Peleg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

We provide a self-contained axiomatization of linear inequality measures for coalitional games. Adding one axiom to those of Weymark (Math. Soc. Sci. 1 (1981), 409-430), we prove that all such measures must be generalized Gini functions of the Shapley value. Also, we generalize the foregoing result to the spaces pNA(μ) of non-atomic games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)328-344
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume53
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1991

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