Location of terror response facilities: A game between state and terrorist

Oded Berman, Arieh Gavious

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

66 Scopus citations


We study a leader follower game with two players: a terrorist and a state where the later one installs facilities that provide support in case of a terrorist attack. While the Terrorist attacks one of the metropolitan areas to maximize his utility, the State, which acts as a leader, installs the facilities such that the metropolitan area attacked is the one that minimizes her disutility (i.e., minimizes 'loss'). We solve the problem efficiently for one facility and we formulate it as a mathematical programming problem for a general number of facilities. We demonstrate the problem via a case study of the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the United States.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1113-1133
Number of pages21
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2006


  • Game theory
  • Location
  • Terror

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Computer Science
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Information Systems and Management


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