TY - JOUR
T1 - Location of terror response facilities
T2 - A game between state and terrorist
AU - Berman, Oded
AU - Gavious, Arieh
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Ed Kaplan for useful comments on an early draft of this paper. The research was partially supported by a grant from NSERC.
PY - 2006/3/1
Y1 - 2006/3/1
N2 - We study a leader follower game with two players: a terrorist and a state where the later one installs facilities that provide support in case of a terrorist attack. While the Terrorist attacks one of the metropolitan areas to maximize his utility, the State, which acts as a leader, installs the facilities such that the metropolitan area attacked is the one that minimizes her disutility (i.e., minimizes 'loss'). We solve the problem efficiently for one facility and we formulate it as a mathematical programming problem for a general number of facilities. We demonstrate the problem via a case study of the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the United States.
AB - We study a leader follower game with two players: a terrorist and a state where the later one installs facilities that provide support in case of a terrorist attack. While the Terrorist attacks one of the metropolitan areas to maximize his utility, the State, which acts as a leader, installs the facilities such that the metropolitan area attacked is the one that minimizes her disutility (i.e., minimizes 'loss'). We solve the problem efficiently for one facility and we formulate it as a mathematical programming problem for a general number of facilities. We demonstrate the problem via a case study of the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the United States.
KW - Game theory
KW - Location
KW - Terror
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33750490397&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2005.12.022
DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2005.12.022
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33750490397
VL - 177
SP - 1113
EP - 1133
JO - European Journal of Operational Research
JF - European Journal of Operational Research
SN - 0377-2217
IS - 2
ER -
