Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions

Gadi Fibich; Arieh Gavious; Aner Sela

doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00611-5

Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions

Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious, Aner Sela

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14 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study first-price auctions with n bidders where bidders' types (valuations for the object) are drawn independently according to heterogeneous distribution functions. We show a relation between the distributions of high types and their equilibrium bids. On the other hand, we show that there is no relation between the distributions of types and equilibrium bids of low types, i.e. the equilibrium bids of low types are invariable.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	283-287
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	75
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00611-5
State	Published - 1 Apr 2002

Keywords

Asymmetric auctions
First-price auctions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00611-5

Cite this

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title = "Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions",

abstract = "We study first-price auctions with n bidders where bidders' types (valuations for the object) are drawn independently according to heterogeneous distribution functions. We show a relation between the distributions of high types and their equilibrium bids. On the other hand, we show that there is no relation between the distributions of types and equilibrium bids of low types, i.e. the equilibrium bids of low types are invariable.",

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AB - We study first-price auctions with n bidders where bidders' types (valuations for the object) are drawn independently according to heterogeneous distribution functions. We show a relation between the distributions of high types and their equilibrium bids. On the other hand, we show that there is no relation between the distributions of types and equilibrium bids of low types, i.e. the equilibrium bids of low types are invariable.

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Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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