Management contribution and the allocation of time in a labor-managed firm

Benjamin Bental, Uri Ben Zion, Menahem Spiegel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


The problem of time allocation in a labor-managed firm is considered under a technology specification in which the role of management in the production process is different from that of "ordinary" members. Two allocation schemes are discussed, the egalitarian and the Nash equilibrium. It is shown that in the model discussed the Nash solution brings about an output level that is lower than the Pareto-optimal output level. If the manager seeks employment opportunities outside the cooperative that reflect his success as manager, he increases his time input so that the output of the cooperative and the "ordinary" members' utility levels increase.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)353-362
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Comparative Economics
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1982
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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