Manipulations in contests

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the classical Tullock's model and show that by a simple non-discriminating rule the contest designer is able to manipulate the outcome of the contest such that the probabilities to win are not ordered according to the contestant's abilities.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)135-139
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume86
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2005

Keywords

  • Contests
  • Tullock's model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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