Mergers and collusion in all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests

Omer Lev, Maria Polukarov, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the effects of bidder collaboration in all-pay auctions. We analyse both mergers, where the remaining players are aware of the agreement between the cooperating participants, and collusion, where the remaining players are unaware of this agreement. We examine two scenarios: the sum-profit model where the auctioneer obtains the sum of all submitted bids, and the max-profit model of crowdsourcing contests where the auctioneer can only use the best submissions and thus obtains only the winning bid. We show that while mergers do not change the expected utility of the participants, or the principal's utility in the sum-profit model, collusion transfers the utility from the non-colluders to the colluders. Surprisingly, we find that in some cases such collaboration can increase the social welfare. Moreover, mergers and, curiously, also collusion can even be beneficial to the auctioneer under certain conditions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication12th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013), May 2013, St. Paul, Minnesota
Pages675-682
Number of pages8
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2013
Event12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013 - Saint Paul, MN, United States
Duration: 6 May 201310 May 2013

Conference

Conference12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySaint Paul, MN
Period6/05/1310/05/13

Keywords

  • All-Pay Auction
  • Collusion
  • Crowdsourcing
  • Mergers

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Mergers and collusion in all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this