Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem

Daniel Berend, Luba Sapir

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

Consider a committee of experts dealing with dichotomous choice problem, where the correctness probabilities are all greater than 1/2. We prove that, if a random subcommittee of odd size m is selected randomly, and entrusted to make a decision by majority vote, its probability of deciding correctly increases with m. This includes a result of Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), who proved that a random subcommittee of size m ≳ 3 is preferable to a random single expert.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)83-92
Number of pages10
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume24
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Feb 2005

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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