Multi-agent pathfínding as a combinatorial auction

Ofra Amir, Guni Sharon, Roni Stern

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper proposes a mapping between multi-agent pathfinding (MAPF) and combinatorial auctions (CAs). In MAPF, agents need to reach their goal destinations without colliding. Algorithms for solving MAPF aim at assigning agents non-conflicting paths that minimize agents' travel costs. In CA problems, agents bid over bundles of items they desire. Auction mechanisms aim at finding an allocation of bundles that maximizes social welfare. In the proposed mapping of MAPF to CAs, agents bid on paths to their goals and the auction allocates non-colliding paths to the agents. Using this formulation, auction mechanisms can be naturally used to solve a range of MAPF problem variants. In particular, auction mechanisms can be applied to non-cooperative settings with self-interested agents while providing optimality guarantees and robustness to manipulations by agents. The paper further shows how to efficiently implement an auction mechanism for MAPF, utilizing methods and representations from both the MAPF and CA literatures.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
PublisherAI Access Foundation
Pages2003-2009
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781577357018
StatePublished - 1 Jun 2015
Event29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015 - Austin, United States
Duration: 25 Jan 201530 Jan 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume3

Conference

Conference29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAustin
Period25/01/1530/01/15

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Artificial Intelligence

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