Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions

Ella Segev, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

26 Scopus citations


We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants[U+05F3] expected highest effort.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)371-382
Number of pages12
JournalEuropean Economic Review
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2014


  • All-pay auctions
  • Sequential contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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