Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants[U+05F3] expected highest effort.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)371-382
Number of pages12
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume70
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2014

Keywords

  • All-pay auctions
  • Sequential contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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