Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives

Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

16 Scopus citations


We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We argue that rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely characterized as the only single-winner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority criterion. We define top-k-counting committee scoring rules and show that the fixed-majority consistent rules are a subclass of the top-k-counting rules. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a top-k-counting rule to satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We show that, for many top-k-counting rules, the complexity of winner determination is high (formally, we show that the problem of deciding if there exists a committee with at least a given score is NP -hard), but we also show examples of rules with polynomial-time winner determination procedures. For some of the computationally hard rules, we provide either exact FPT algorithms or approximate polynomial-time algorithms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)513-550
Number of pages38
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Oct 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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