TY - JOUR
T1 - Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule
T2 - axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
AU - Faliszewski, Piotr
AU - Skowron, Piotr
AU - Slinko, Arkadii
AU - Talmon, Nimrod
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, The Author(s).
PY - 2018/10/1
Y1 - 2018/10/1
N2 - We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We argue that rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely characterized as the only single-winner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority criterion. We define top-k-counting committee scoring rules and show that the fixed-majority consistent rules are a subclass of the top-k-counting rules. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a top-k-counting rule to satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We show that, for many top-k-counting rules, the complexity of winner determination is high (formally, we show that the problem of deciding if there exists a committee with at least a given score is NP -hard), but we also show examples of rules with polynomial-time winner determination procedures. For some of the computationally hard rules, we provide either exact FPT algorithms or approximate polynomial-time algorithms.
AB - We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We argue that rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely characterized as the only single-winner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority criterion. We define top-k-counting committee scoring rules and show that the fixed-majority consistent rules are a subclass of the top-k-counting rules. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a top-k-counting rule to satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We show that, for many top-k-counting rules, the complexity of winner determination is high (formally, we show that the problem of deciding if there exists a committee with at least a given score is NP -hard), but we also show examples of rules with polynomial-time winner determination procedures. For some of the computationally hard rules, we provide either exact FPT algorithms or approximate polynomial-time algorithms.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85045734564&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-018-1126-4
DO - 10.1007/s00355-018-1126-4
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85045734564
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 51
SP - 513
EP - 550
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 3
ER -