@inproceedings{d82ddf5704d04d1ea27af5c180fad3f2,
title = "Multiwinner rules with variable number of winners",
abstract = "We consider voting rules for approval-based elections that select committees whose size is not predetermined. Unlike the study of rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning candidates, the study of rules that select a variable number of winners has only recently been initiated. We first mention some scenarios for which such rules are applicable. Then, aiming at better understanding these rules, we study their computational properties and report on simulations regarding the sizes of their committees.",
author = "Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko and Nimrod Talmon",
note = "Funding Information: Piotr Faliszewski was partially supported by the funds of Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education assigned to AGH University of Science and Technology. Nimrod Talmon was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 630/19). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 The authors and IOS Press.; 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2020, including 10th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence, PAIS 2020 ; Conference date: 29-08-2020 Through 08-09-2020",
year = "2020",
month = aug,
day = "24",
doi = "10.3233/FAIA200077",
language = "English",
series = "Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications",
publisher = "IOS Press BV",
pages = "67--74",
editor = "{De Giacomo}, Giuseppe and Alejandro Catala and Bistra Dilkina and Michela Milano and Senen Barro and Alberto Bugarin and Jerome Lang",
booktitle = "ECAI 2020 - 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, including 10th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence, PAIS 2020 - Proceedings",
address = "Netherlands",
}