Abstract
Unconscious perceptions (i.e., person-level perceptions that lack phenomenal character) have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin’s to develop a new version of naive realism—neuro-computational naive realism. I argue that neuro-computational naive realism offers a uniform treatment of both conscious and unconscious perceptions. I also argue that it accommodates the possibility of phenomenally different conscious perceptions of the same items, and that it can answer a further challenge to naive realism raised by Berger and Nanay.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1175-1190 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Erkenntnis |
Volume | 87 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 10 Mar 2020 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
- Logic