Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions

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1 Scopus citations


Unconscious perceptions (i.e., person-level perceptions that lack phenomenal character) have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin’s to develop a new version of naive realism—neuro-computational naive realism. I argue that neuro-computational naive realism offers a uniform treatment of both conscious and unconscious perceptions. I also argue that it accommodates the possibility of phenomenally different conscious perceptions of the same items, and that it can answer a further challenge to naive realism raised by Berger and Nanay.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1175-1190
Number of pages16
Issue number3
StatePublished - 10 Mar 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic


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