Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to present a theory of the most salient aspect of the phenomenal character of pain – namely, the painfulness of pain or its negative affective quality. This task involves developing an account of the evaluative structure of pain, according to which painfulness is constituted by a (subjectively) frustrated (first-order) conative attitude that is directed towards the bodily condition the obtaining of which the pain represents. The argument for the proposed Attitudinal-Representational Theory of Pain proceeds by presenting an explanatory challenge that concerns crucial aspects of the reason-giving force of pain, and showing that, unlike extant theories of pain, it successfully accounts for them.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 382-408 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
Volume | 99 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Sep 2019 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
- History and Philosophy of Science