On a new logical problem of evil

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2 Scopus citations

Abstract

J. L. Schellenberg has formulated two versions of a new logical argument from evil, an argument he claims to be immune to Alvin Plantinga's free will defense. The first version assumes that God created the world to model God's goodness, and the second to share with the world the good that already existed. In either case, the good of the world, like that of God, should not require or allow any evil. I argue that the new argument, if correct, would pay a heavy price to avoid the free will defense. I then go on to show that neither version of the argument is sound. So, there is no new problem of evil.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)439-452
Number of pages14
JournalFaith and Philosophy
Volume32
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Oct 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Religious studies
  • Philosophy

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