On connected coalitions in dominated simple games

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26 Scopus citations


In a book by Axelrod it is claimed that, in the presence of well defined policy order, only connected coalitions form. Here we investigate the compatability of Axelrod's hypothesis with several hypotheses (about coalition formation in dominated simple game) that were formulated by Peleg.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)103-125
Number of pages23
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Jun 1985
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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