Abstract
In a book by Axelrod it is claimed that, in the presence of well defined policy order, only connected coalitions form. Here we investigate the compatability of Axelrod's hypothesis with several hypotheses (about coalition formation in dominated simple game) that were formulated by Peleg.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 103-125 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Jun 1985 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty