On discrete preferences and coordination

Flavio Chierichetti, Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Scopus citations


An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and the decisions of her neighbors. A basic question that has remained largely open is to consider games where the players’ strategies come from a fixed, discrete set, and where players may have different preferences among the possible strategies. We develop a set of techniques for analyzing this class of games, which we refer to as discrete preference games. We parametrize the games by the relative extent to which a player takes into account the effect of her preferred strategy and the effect of her neighbors’ strategies, allowing us to interpolate between network coordination games and unilateral decision-making. We focus on the efficiency of the best Nash equilibrium and provide conditions on when the optimal solution is also a Nash equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)11-29
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Computer and System Sciences
StatePublished - 1 May 2018


  • Algorithmic game theory
  • Price of stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Applied Mathematics


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