On hoarding in contract theory

Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(91)90098-6

On hoarding in contract theory

Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper examines the practice of ignoring hoarding in the theory of repeated contracts by analyzing a two-period signalling game. It is shown that (a) hoarding could be an equilibrium, and (b) excluding it from the model is equivalent to adding assumptions on the optimal contract.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	21-25
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	35
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90098-6
State	Published - 1 Jan 1991
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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On hoarding in contract theory

Abstract

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