On hoarding in contract theory

Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper examines the practice of ignoring hoarding in the theory of repeated contracts by analyzing a two-period signalling game. It is shown that (a) hoarding could be an equilibrium, and (b) excluding it from the model is equivalent to adding assumptions on the optimal contract.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)21-25
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1991
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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