On self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge

Burak Ünveren; Murat Donduran; Guy Barokas

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.007

On self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge

Burak Ünveren, Murat Donduran, Guy Barokas

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3 Scopus citations

Abstract

This study analyzes the space of all continuous and discrete games to see whether self- and other-regarding cooperation are similar or inherently different. The solution concept for self-regarding cooperation is the Kantian equilibrium while other-regarding (i.e., altruistic) cooperation corresponds to the Berge equilibrium. We find that any Pareto-efficient Berge is generically a Kantian equilibrium in all symmetric games (e.g., prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, etc.), whether they are continuous or discrete. In asymmetric games, however, Kant and Berge are generically different. These results suggest that self- and other-regarding cooperation is tight-knit under symmetry, a ubiquitous assumption in applied game theory, albeit asymmetric games do not allow a similar close connection.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-20
Number of pages	20
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	141
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.007
State	Published - 1 Sep 2023
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Berge equilibrium
Cooperation
Kantian equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.007

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abstract = "This study analyzes the space of all continuous and discrete games to see whether self- and other-regarding cooperation are similar or inherently different. The solution concept for self-regarding cooperation is the Kantian equilibrium while other-regarding (i.e., altruistic) cooperation corresponds to the Berge equilibrium. We find that any Pareto-efficient Berge is generically a Kantian equilibrium in all symmetric games (e.g., prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, etc.), whether they are continuous or discrete. In asymmetric games, however, Kant and Berge are generically different. These results suggest that self- and other-regarding cooperation is tight-knit under symmetry, a ubiquitous assumption in applied game theory, albeit asymmetric games do not allow a similar close connection.",

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AB - This study analyzes the space of all continuous and discrete games to see whether self- and other-regarding cooperation are similar or inherently different. The solution concept for self-regarding cooperation is the Kantian equilibrium while other-regarding (i.e., altruistic) cooperation corresponds to the Berge equilibrium. We find that any Pareto-efficient Berge is generically a Kantian equilibrium in all symmetric games (e.g., prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, etc.), whether they are continuous or discrete. In asymmetric games, however, Kant and Berge are generically different. These results suggest that self- and other-regarding cooperation is tight-knit under symmetry, a ubiquitous assumption in applied game theory, albeit asymmetric games do not allow a similar close connection.

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On self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge

Abstract

Keywords

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