On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

26 Scopus citations


We show that when firms have incomplete information about the market demand and their costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we also find some sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More general results arise when negative prices are possible.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)77-94
Number of pages18
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2010


  • Bayesian
  • Cournot
  • Equilibrium
  • Existence
  • Incomplete information
  • Oligopoly
  • Uniqueness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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