On the least core and the mas-colell bargaining set

Ezra Einy, Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

We show that the least core of a TU coalitional game with a finite set of players is contained in the Mas-Colell bargaining set. This result is extended to games with a measurable space of players in which the worth of the grand coalition is at least that of any other coalition in the game. As a consequence, we obtain an existence theorem for the Mas-Colell bargaining set in TU games with a measurable space of players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)181-188
Number of pages8
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume28
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Aug 1999

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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