On the least core and the mas-colell bargaining set

Ezra Einy; Ron Holzman; Dov Monderer

doi:10.1006/game.1998.0694

On the least core and the mas-colell bargaining set

Ezra Einy
, Ron Holzman
, Dov Monderer

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

We show that the least core of a TU coalitional game with a finite set of players is contained in the Mas-Colell bargaining set. This result is extended to games with a measurable space of players in which the worth of the grand coalition is at least that of any other coalition in the game. As a consequence, we obtain an existence theorem for the Mas-Colell bargaining set in TU games with a measurable space of players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	181-188
Number of pages	8
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	28
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0694
State	Published - 1 Aug 1999

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/game.1998.0694

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AB - We show that the least core of a TU coalitional game with a finite set of players is contained in the Mas-Colell bargaining set. This result is extended to games with a measurable space of players in which the worth of the grand coalition is at least that of any other coalition in the game. As a consequence, we obtain an existence theorem for the Mas-Colell bargaining set in TU games with a measurable space of players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.

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On the least core and the mas-colell bargaining set

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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