TY - JOUR
T1 - On The Vulnerability of Anti-Malware Solutions to DNS Attacks
AU - Nadler, Asaf
AU - Bitton, Ron
AU - Brodt, Oleg
AU - Shabtai, Asaf
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2022/5/1
Y1 - 2022/5/1
N2 - Anti-malware agents typically communicate with their remote services to
share information about suspicious files. These remote services use
their up-to-date information and global context (view) to help classify
the files and instruct their agents to take a predetermined action
(e.g., delete or quarantine). In this study, we provide a security
analysis of a specific form of communication between anti-malware agents
and their services, which takes place entirely over the insecure DNS
protocol. These services, which we denote DNS anti-malware list (DNSAML)
services, affect the classification of files scanned by anti-malware
agents, therefore potentially putting their consumers at risk due to
known integrity and confidentiality flaws of the DNS protocol. By
analyzing a large-scale DNS traffic dataset made available to the
authors by a well-known CDN provider, we identify anti-malware solutions
that seem to make use of DNSAML services. We found that these solutions,
deployed on almost three million machines worldwide, exchange hundreds
of millions of DNS requests daily. These requests are carrying sensitive
file scan information, oftentimes - as we demonstrate - without any
additional safeguards to compensate for the insecurities of the DNS
protocol. As a result, these anti-malware solutions that use DNSAML are
made vulnerable to DNS attacks. For instance, an attacker capable of
tampering with DNS queries, gains the ability to alter the
classification of scanned files, without presence on the scanning
machine. We showcase three attacks applicable to at least three
anti-malware solutions that could result in the disclosure of sensitive
information and improper behavior of the anti-malware agent, such as
ignoring detected threats. Finally, we propose and review a set of
countermeasures for anti-malware solution providers to prevent the
attacks stemming from the use of DNSAML services.
AB - Anti-malware agents typically communicate with their remote services to
share information about suspicious files. These remote services use
their up-to-date information and global context (view) to help classify
the files and instruct their agents to take a predetermined action
(e.g., delete or quarantine). In this study, we provide a security
analysis of a specific form of communication between anti-malware agents
and their services, which takes place entirely over the insecure DNS
protocol. These services, which we denote DNS anti-malware list (DNSAML)
services, affect the classification of files scanned by anti-malware
agents, therefore potentially putting their consumers at risk due to
known integrity and confidentiality flaws of the DNS protocol. By
analyzing a large-scale DNS traffic dataset made available to the
authors by a well-known CDN provider, we identify anti-malware solutions
that seem to make use of DNSAML services. We found that these solutions,
deployed on almost three million machines worldwide, exchange hundreds
of millions of DNS requests daily. These requests are carrying sensitive
file scan information, oftentimes - as we demonstrate - without any
additional safeguards to compensate for the insecurities of the DNS
protocol. As a result, these anti-malware solutions that use DNSAML are
made vulnerable to DNS attacks. For instance, an attacker capable of
tampering with DNS queries, gains the ability to alter the
classification of scanned files, without presence on the scanning
machine. We showcase three attacks applicable to at least three
anti-malware solutions that could result in the disclosure of sensitive
information and improper behavior of the anti-malware agent, such as
ignoring detected threats. Finally, we propose and review a set of
countermeasures for anti-malware solution providers to prevent the
attacks stemming from the use of DNSAML services.
KW - Anti-malware
KW - DNS
KW - Information disclosure
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85126109420&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.cose.2022.102687
DO - 10.1016/j.cose.2022.102687
M3 - Article
VL - 116
JO - Computers and Security
JF - Computers and Security
SN - 0167-4048
M1 - 102687
ER -