Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects

Ran Eilat, Ady Pauzner

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study a private-values buyer-seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)503-512
Number of pages10
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2011
Externally publishedYes


  • Bargaining
  • Bilateral trade
  • Buyer-seller problem
  • Mechanism design
  • Multiple objects
  • Private values

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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