Abstract
We study a private-values buyer-seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 503-512 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 71 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Mar 2011 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Bargaining
- Bilateral trade
- Buyer-seller problem
- Mechanism design
- Multiple objects
- Private values
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics