Abstract
This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of rent-seeking contests in terms of the amount and the timing of effort they elicit from the participants. The optimal contest structure - the one that maximizes the discounted sum of efforts - is found to hinge on the degree of impatience of the contest organizers, the more patient of whom prefer longer contests consisting of pairwise matches among the contestants. Heterogeneity of the contestants' quality also turns out to play an important role in the comparison.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 575-585 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | European Journal of Political Economy |
Volume | 14 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 1998 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- C72
- Contest design
- D72
- Economic analysis of contests
- Rent seeking
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Political Science and International Relations