Optimal rewards in contests

Chen Cohen, Todd R Kaplan, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

29 Scopus citations


We study all-pay contests with effort-dependent rewards under incomplete information. A contestant's value to winning depends not only on his type but also on the effort-dependent reward chosen by the designer. We analyze which reward is optimal for the designer when his objective is either total effort or highest effort. We find that under certain conditions the optimal reward may either be negative or even decreasing in effort; however, we find no advantage to having multiple rewards.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)434-451
Number of pages18
JournalThe Rand journal of economics
Issue number2
StatePublished - 16 Sep 2008

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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