Optimal taxation and fiscal constitution

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Abstract

Assuming a world with excessive taxes, the focuses of this paper are political mechanisms that ensure efficiency enhancing restraints on taxes. In particular, it is shown that supermajority requirements to approve tax increases, as currently used in some US states, is the means of attaining this objective. Their relationship to another such mechanism prevalent in earlier centuries, that of franchise restrictions, is discussed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)471-485
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume72
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1999

Keywords

  • Commitment
  • Fiscal constitution
  • Optimal taxation
  • Supermajority

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