Optimization-Based Voting Rule Design: The Closer to Utopia the Better

Piotr Faliszewski; Stanislaw Szufa; Nimrod Talmon

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-84997-9_2

Optimization-Based Voting Rule Design: The Closer to Utopia the Better

Piotr Faliszewski, Stanislaw Szufa, Nimrod Talmon

Department of Industrial Engineering and Management

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract

In certain situations, such as elections in a Euclidean domain, it is possible to specify clear requirements for the operation of a multiwinner voting rule, for it to provide committees that correspond to some desirable intuitive notions (such as individual excellence of committee members or their diversity). We formally describe several such requirements, which we refer to as “utopias”. Supplied with such utopias, we develop an optimization-based mechanism for constructing committee scoring rules that provide results as close to these utopias as possible; we test our mechanism on weakly separable and OWA-based rules. Using our method we acquire some interesting insights as well as recover some believed connections between known multiwinner voting rules and certain applications and get other interesting insights.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Collective Decisions: Theory, Algorithms And Decision Support Systems
Editors	Tomasz Szapiro, Janusz Kacprzyk
Publisher	Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages	17-51
Number of pages	35
ISBN (Print)	9783030849979
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84997-9_2
State	Published - 1 Jan 2022

Publication series

Name	Studies in Systems, Decision and Control
Volume	392
ISSN (Print)	2198-4182
ISSN (Electronic)	2198-4190

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Science (miscellaneous)
Control and Systems Engineering
Automotive Engineering
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
Control and Optimization
Decision Sciences (miscellaneous)

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10.1007/978-3-030-84997-9_2

Cite this

Faliszewski, P., Szufa, S., & Talmon, N. (2022). Optimization-Based Voting Rule Design: The Closer to Utopia the Better. In T. Szapiro, & J. Kacprzyk (Eds.), Collective Decisions: Theory, Algorithms And Decision Support Systems (pp. 17-51). (Studies in Systems, Decision and Control; Vol. 392). Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84997-9_2

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title = "Optimization-Based Voting Rule Design: The Closer to Utopia the Better",

abstract = "In certain situations, such as elections in a Euclidean domain, it is possible to specify clear requirements for the operation of a multiwinner voting rule, for it to provide committees that correspond to some desirable intuitive notions (such as individual excellence of committee members or their diversity). We formally describe several such requirements, which we refer to as “utopias”. Supplied with such utopias, we develop an optimization-based mechanism for constructing committee scoring rules that provide results as close to these utopias as possible; we test our mechanism on weakly separable and OWA-based rules. Using our method we acquire some interesting insights as well as recover some believed connections between known multiwinner voting rules and certain applications and get other interesting insights.",

author = "Piotr Faliszewski and Stanislaw Szufa and Nimrod Talmon",

note = "Funding Information: Acknowledgements Preliminary version of this paper was presented at the AAMAS-2018 conference and at the COMSOC-2018 workshop. The current version contains additional discussions and an extended set of results (including all results for the OWA/Approval-based rules). Further, the current version corrects several mistakes that appeared in the AAMAS-2018 paper. We are very grateful to all the reviewers who commented on this paper. Piotr Faliszewski was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, under project 2016/21/B/ST6/01509. Nimrod Talmon was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF; Grant No. 630/19). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.",

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Faliszewski, P, Szufa, S & Talmon, N 2022, Optimization-Based Voting Rule Design: The Closer to Utopia the Better. in T Szapiro & J Kacprzyk (eds), Collective Decisions: Theory, Algorithms And Decision Support Systems. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, vol. 392, Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, pp. 17-51. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84997-9_2

Optimization-Based Voting Rule Design: The Closer to Utopia the Better. / Faliszewski, Piotr; Szufa, Stanislaw; Talmon, Nimrod.
Collective Decisions: Theory, Algorithms And Decision Support Systems. ed. / Tomasz Szapiro; Janusz Kacprzyk. Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, 2022. p. 17-51 (Studies in Systems, Decision and Control; Vol. 392).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

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AB - In certain situations, such as elections in a Euclidean domain, it is possible to specify clear requirements for the operation of a multiwinner voting rule, for it to provide committees that correspond to some desirable intuitive notions (such as individual excellence of committee members or their diversity). We formally describe several such requirements, which we refer to as “utopias”. Supplied with such utopias, we develop an optimization-based mechanism for constructing committee scoring rules that provide results as close to these utopias as possible; we test our mechanism on weakly separable and OWA-based rules. Using our method we acquire some interesting insights as well as recover some believed connections between known multiwinner voting rules and certain applications and get other interesting insights.

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Optimization-Based Voting Rule Design: The Closer to Utopia the Better

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