@inproceedings{942e70438b2d4470947dc0c340cc698b,
title = "Parliamentary voting procedures: Agenda control, manipulation, and uncertainty",
abstract = "We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding possible winners is NP-hard for both procedures. Whereas finding necessary winners is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.",
author = "Robert Bredereck and Jiehua Chen and Rolf Niedermeier and Toby Walsh",
year = "2015",
month = jan,
day = "1",
language = "English",
series = "IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence",
publisher = "International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence",
pages = "164--170",
editor = "Michael Wooldridge and Qiang Yang",
booktitle = "IJCAI 2015 - Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence",
note = "24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015 ; Conference date: 25-07-2015 Through 31-07-2015",
}