Pay or play

Sigal Oren, Michael Schapira, Moshe Tennenholtz

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

Abstract

We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and another with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This is, arguably, the simplest setting that models selection among certain and uncertain outcomes in a multi-agent system. We study the properties of equilibria in such games from both a game-theoretic perspective and a computational perspective. Our main positive result establishes the existence of a semi-strong equilibrium in every such game. We show that although simple, pay or play games contain well-studied environments, e.g., vaccination games. We discuss the interesting implications of our results for these environments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages488-497
Number of pages10
StatePublished - 28 Nov 2013
Externally publishedYes
Event29th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2013 - Bellevue, WA, United States
Duration: 11 Jul 201315 Jul 2013

Conference

Conference29th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBellevue, WA
Period11/07/1315/07/13

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