Abstract
This paper considers single item auctions in the private values framework, with buyers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of Yaari's [Econometrica 55 (1987) 95] dual theory of choice under risk. It is shown that when their valuations are independently distributed, risk averse buyers are indifferent among all the auctions contained in a large family of mechanisms that includes the standard auctions.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 231-237 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Volume | 76 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jul 2002 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Auctions
- Non-expected utility
- Risk aversion
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics