Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk: A correction

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This note corrects a mistake in Volij (2002) “Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk,” Economics Letters, 76(2), 231–237. It shows the payoff equivalence of a family of auctions when risk-averse bidders behave according to Yaari's dual theory of choice under risk.

Original languageEnglish
Article number112139
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume247
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Feb 2025

Keywords

  • Auctions
  • Non-expected utility
  • Risk aversion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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